Royal Institute Philosophy- Katherine Puddifoot, Can memories be unjust?

What we remember is a central expression of who we are. So what should we remember, and what is best forgotten? Talks will focus on various aspects of the question, such as trauma, conflict resolution, forgiving and forgetting, memorialization, and constructing identities on- and off-line. Explore these questions, among others, through the lens of philosophy at the 2024/5 London Lectures.

Can memories be unjust?

Speaker: Katherine Puddifoot is Associate Professor in Philosophy at Durham University. She works on topics at the intersection of social philosophy, social epistemology, and philosophy of psychology. Much of her previous work has focused on stereotyping and implicit bias, including her OUP book, How Stereotypes Deceive Us. In more recent work she has been focused primarily on human memory and how both memories and conceptions of memory are implicated in injustice.

If asked to name things that are unjust you might mention things like rules, laws, pay, distribution of wealth, or homelessness. This talk argues that, in addition to these things, our recollections of events in our personal pasts can be unjust. How we remember the past, including the behaviours of others, can be shaped by social stereotypes. This can be unjust because it can be demeaning, disrespectful and harmful to people whose behaviour is falsely recalled. However, when we view something as a genuine memory, we tend to treat it as trustworthy. I take these two observations to call for a radical rethinking of what we classify as genuine memories. We ought, I argue, to specifically develop a conception of memory that excludes unjust recollections from being genuine memories. In doing this, we can deny them authority—the authority that they would get from being classified as genuine memories.

Host or Publisher The Royal Institute of Philosophy