Simon Shogry: The Stoics on Simultaneous Mental Conflict

Plato famously argues in Republic IV that simultaneous mental conflict, in the form of akrasia or weakness of will, reveals an important fact about the structure of the human soul: it contains both rational and non-rational sources of motivation. The Stoics reject Platonic tripartition in favor of a Socratic-style intellectualism, according to which all our judgments, desires, and aversions stem from the activity of reason. For the Stoics, there are no non-rational sources of motivation and cognition in an adult human agent. This implies that Platonic akrasia, in which a non-rational desire overpowers a rational aversion, is impossible. But consistently with their intellectualism, can the Stoics recognize other forms of simultaneous mental conflict? Can reason itself be stricken at one and the same time with opposing judgments, desires, or aversions? Shogry will argue yes here, against the scholarly consensus that it is only diachronic mental conflict that is admitted within Stoic moral psychology. The analysis of the passions (pathê) given by the Stoic Chrysippus presupposes the existence of simultaneous conflict in the rational judgments held by the passionate agent. Indeed, it is this fact which makes possible their cure.

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About Simon Shogry

Simon Shogry is a Tutorial Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University. He is a specialist in Hellenistic philosophy, focusing on Stoic logic, epistemology, and ethics. He is also interested in Epicurean epistemology and Platonic and Aristo

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