PIPE Workshop: Amna Salam (UCSD)

How should a President choose a Supreme Court nominee when an appointment can change both what the Court decides and which disputes it hears? We extend the Rule of Four's case-selection logic to a nomination choice made before petitions arise. The President evaluates policy across disputes the Court hears and those whose existing outcomes remain in force. When an anticipated merits outcome lies beyond a hearing pivot, an appointment can change review by moving the outcome, the pivot, or both. We show that a President may prefer a nominee whose Court would issue less congenial decisions in disputes a Court without that appointee would still hear if that nominee also causes the Court to replace sufficiently unfavorable existing outcomes in other disputes. This incentive depends on feasible nominees, opinion formation, and the distribution and policy importance of potential disputes. An appointment's effect on case selection can change the President's preferred nominee even without a separate preference for a larger docket.